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This paper argues for the importance of individuals’ tolerance of inequality for 
economic growth. By using the political ideology of governments as a measure of 
revealed tolerance of inequality, the paper shows that controlling for ideology improves 
the accuracy with which the effects of inequality are measured. Results show that 
inequality reduces growth but more so in societies where people perceive it as being 
relatively unfair. Further results indicate that legal quality and social trust are likely 
transmission channels for the effects of inequality. 
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  11. Introduction 
Social scientists have been interested in economic inequality for centuries, although for 
quite disparate reasons. Marxism was to a large extent born out of a concern for the less 
privileged in industrializing societies with very unequal distributions of income and 
power, and concluded that increasing inequality would eventually lead to social strife 
and division, i.e. the masses would rise against ‘capitalist oppression’. Other classical 
traditions as those founded by e.g. von Mises and Hayek instead tended to focus on the 
positive incentive effects of income inequality. A vast theoretical literature now fills the 
gaps on the scale covering an equally wide range of possibilities. In particular, the new 
economic growth theory suggests a number of channels leading from inequality to 
growth: incentive structures may be weakened by fighting inequality, human capital 
accumulation can be hindered, inequality can lead to political instability and distortions 
from increased government intervention, the quality of the legal system can be 
undermined by polarization, and any form of social distance may lead to lower social 
trust. Such theoretical ambiguity with respect to transmission mechanisms and net effect 
therefore creates an almost infinite variety of possibilities to be scrutinized in empirical 
studies.  
 
This paper suggests an extension to the literature by taking into account individuals’ 
mental models - the “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or 
images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action” (Peter 
Senge, quoted in Lindsay, 2000: 284). Mental models are internal representations that 
all human beings cognitively create to interpret their environment since they in general 
neither have full information about the real reasons and underlying mechanisms of 
events affecting their livelihood, nor possess infinite computational capacities to process 
such information. These models need not reflect the world as it is; yet they are the 
representations upon which individuals rationally base their actions and through which 
they assess the actions of others.
1 Agents with differing mental models can thus 
                                                 
1 Headey (1991, 593) makes the point clear by concluding that, “it should not be assumed that public 
perceptions of the distribution of social goods are even remotely accurate”. He furthermore assesses that 
“a normative standard of equality appears systematically to distort perceptions of reality”. In other words, 
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structural features of society. Different political ideologies provide different 
explanations of how inequality comes to be, which, as they become part of individuals’ 
mental models of society, also form the basis for making normative assessments of 
whether income inequality is fair and what (if anything) ought to be done about it. Such 
assessments could potentially affect individuals’ economic and political behavior.  
 
The paper attempts to shed new light on a much-researched issue by hypothesizing that 
cultural and ideological features, inherent in people’s mental models of the economy, 
matter for the effect of income inequality on economic growth. Specifically, theoretical 
considerations point to a particular form of parameter heterogeneity of inequality’s 
effects depending on individuals’ tolerance of inequality and the degree to which they 
perceive it to be fair. The paper proxies such tolerance by political ideology as revealed 
by voter behavior in national elections. It thereafter tests whether inequality in 
conjunction with ideology adds insight to the standard association between inequality 
and growth. The findings support the notion that part of the effect on economic growth 
is mediated by individuals’ tolerance of inequality. Without controlling for ideology, the 
effects of inequality are imprecisely measured but with such controls estimates become 
substantially more accurate. The results show that inequality is more detrimental to 
growth in societies where people perceive it as more unfair and thus have a lower 
tolerance of inequality. Legal quality and social trust emerge as likely transmission 
channels for these effects.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores some of the theoretical 
mechanisms connecting inequality to economic growth, showing how they might 
                                                                                                                                               
people’s mental models are most often outright wrong, yet persistent features of national culture. In an 
effort to explain this, North (1994: 363) makes the point that “a common cultural heritage provides a 
means of reducing the divergence in the mental models that people in a society have and constitutes the 
means for the intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions”. With the fact that values, ideologies and 
beliefs are also transmitted intergenerationally and contribute to defining mental models, perceptions can 
be expected to be relatively stable over time. 
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describes the remaining data. Section 5 presents the results of cross-country regressions. 
Section 6 concludes upon the paper and draws some tentative policy implications. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical considerations 
The theoretical literature suggests a number of different mechanisms while a substantial 
empirical literature has examined the implications for growth with varying results. In 
the following, I describe some of the mechanisms implying both negative and positive 
relations between inequality and growth that could be influenced by voters’ tolerance of 
it. All are causal relations going from inequality to growth; hence, this paper only deals 
with inequality’s effects on growth, not the reverse relation.
2
 
2.1. Growth studies 
First of all, the classical textbook mechanism linking inequality to higher growth runs 
through the influence on incentive structures (e.g. von Mises, 2000 [1955]; North, 1991; 
Olson, 1996). The argument is that the effort people put into income generation depends 
on the expected rate of return to effort, which by definition is larger in societies with 
more unequal distributions of income. Hence, people will in general work relatively 
harder in such societies than in more egalitarian societies, all other things being equal. 
Pedersen and Smith (2002) provide a striking example of such effects by estimating the 
income gains from taking employment in Denmark, one of the most egalitarian societies 
in the world, where they find that welfare benefits are so generous that 15 percent of all 
unemployed females would experience a reduction of income by taking employment. 
Likewise, the extremely egalitarian ideology in the now collapsed communist societies 
                                                 
2 The reverse relation, running from income to inequality, is the so-called Kuznets curve for which there 
are good theoretical arguments and counterarguments. Kuznets and others following him argue that the 
transition from old to new technologies creates winners and losers and thereby polarizes the income 
distribution. Max Weber (1992 [1930], p. 68), on the other side, noted that there are winners and losers, 
but winners are most often from the “hard school of life”. Hence, Weber’s argument has that development 
of new technology tends to create a middle class. The empirical literature remains unresolved (Persson 
and Tabellini, 1992; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Barro, 2000).  
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pretends to pay us, we pretend to work”.  
 
In the long run, such institutionally induced differences in effort are therefore bound to 
materialize in the growth rate but only to the extent that they affect individuals’ merit 
assumptions. If individuals for example believe that inequality derives from merit, i.e. 
that some people earn more because they for one or another reason deserve so, then 
inequality will be a signal that it is worth doing an effort and thus induce such effort. In 
other words, the mere perception of an incentive to work harder may raise workers’ 
productivity and thus also affect the economic performance of a country. It is worth 
noting that this notion comes close to arguing for the effects of a Weberian work ethic. 
It thus also follows that when such perceptions prevail, people will in general be more 
inclined to tolerate income inequality. 
 
A whole family of alternative theoretical channels is suggested by political economy 
where the median voter theorem indicates that politicians will introduce various 
schemes to redistribute income to low-income groups to the extent that the median voter 
has preferences for more equity and thus has low tolerance of inequality. The standard 
treatment of the argument is that inequality in itself leads the median voter to want 
redistribution, which is most likely achieved through increasing the marginal taxation of 
higher incomes with the revenue often used to subsidize low-income owners (e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). This has (at least) four potential effects: 1) placing a 
higher proportion of the tax burden on the wealthy part of society may in a Kaldorian 
optic lead to lower savings and thus less growth (Kaldor, 1956); 2) fiscal redistribution 
can weaken incentive structures; 3) schemes of redistribution have a strong tendency to 
increase government involvement in the economy, which is often found to retard growth 
(Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Barro 1997; Scully, 2002); and 4) redistribution might, 
on the other hand, alleviate problems of investing in human capital caused by financial 
markets imperfections (Perotti, 1993; Barro, 2000). Turning to the empirical literature, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) suggest that the negative effect of inequality works 
through government policy whereas Deininger and Squire (1998) fail to find evidence 
of this association and Rodriguez (1999) even questions whether inequality leads to 
  5more redistribution in the first place. Yet, the median voter’s tolerance of inequality 
should be reflected in actual policy and the normal functioning of democracy therefore 
has the effect of increasing redistribution, although more so in countries where the 
median voter has a ‘leftwing’ political conviction, as the left wing traditionally is more 
averse to inequality. The scope of intervention thus not only reflects the level of 
inequality, but also the extent to which voters perceive inequality as something that can 
and should be alleviated. 
 
Several studies present another explanation deriving from political economy, which 
suggests that income inequality is associated with political instability, as less privileged 
groups may opt for using undemocratic means to improve their situation (e.g. Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1996). As this is more likely to happen in societies with more 
unequal income distributions, inequality may thus create instability,
 which retards 
investment and thereby eventually lowers growth (Barro, 1997).
3 However, this link 
indicates that inequality is more harmful to growth in less democratic societies where 
the scope for undemocratic action by definition is larger, yet Clarke (1995) finds 
tentative evidence of the opposite relation while Knack and Keefer (1997) fails to find 
any differences between democracies and non-democratic regimes. Research on 
political violence has nonetheless stressed the importance of how inequality is perceived 
and sociologists have for years been interested in the extent to which individuals 
tolerate inequality. Shepelak and Alwin (1985: 44), for example, find that “when 
individuals accept responsibility for their social rewards relative to others, rather than 
challenging the structure of economic relations, voices of discontent are not heard and 
revolutions in the socioeconomic order do not occur”. Wang (1993: 982) also notes that 
                                                 
3 There is some discussion whether political instability affects long run growth. Campos and Nugent 
(2002) thus suggests that it does not while Fosu (2001) indicates that the insignificant relation found by 
many studies is caused by measurement error. Using a more precise measure, he finds a robust negative 
relation between instability and growth in Africa. Carmignani (2003) provides a survey of the literature, 
showing that the standard result is a negative association. It is worth noting that the idea of this 
mechanism in its extreme form comes close to an essentially Marxist understanding of the forces of 
history. 
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no perceived discrepancy between what people actually get and what they expect to 
get”. Hence, inequality per se may only lead to political instability to the degree that 
people perceive it to be unfair. 
 
The final mechanisms to be mentioned are suggested by recent research in social capital 
and institutional economics. Keefer and Knack (2002) find that income inequality 
reduces growth through its adverse effects on the security of property rights more than 
through any other channel advanced by the literature. They conclude that polarization 
“can reduce the legitimacy of property and contractual rights, making their enforcement 
more costly” (Keefer and Knack, 2002: 132). The weakening of the protection of 
property rights in turn leads to poorer economic performance (Barro, 1991, 1997; North, 
1994; Knack and Keefer, 1995). In this literature, inequality is also found to lead to 
lower levels of generalized trust by increasing the social distance between rich and poor, 
making interactions between these groups less likely and contradicting people’s notions 
of fairness, which in turn leads to lower economic growth (Whiteley, 2000; Zak and 
Knack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002).  However, the effect of inequality on social trust could 
arguably depend on how people perceive it. Poor people believing that income 
inequality is a choice variable of some group that defines the income distribution in 
people’s mental representation of society may come to perceive their own relative 
poverty as a signal of non-cooperative behavior of those richer than themselves, which 
undermines trust across income groups. For example, people with leftwing sympathies 
often subscribe to a quasi-Marxist view of society as divided in distinct ‘classes’ that do 
not have coinciding objectives and will therefore tend to have less trust in people 
outside what they perceive as their own class. On the other hand, Uslaner (2002: 86) 
notes that “if you believe that economic stratification is justifiable, then you have no 
need to trust those below you on the economic ladder”.
4 As trust is central to most 
                                                 
4 Uslaner (2002) and others make the same argument for racial differences in the US. The core of the 
argument can be summarized in the question why you should trust someone in another segment of society 
when it is improbable that you will ever come to belong to that segment. 
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indirectly, although not in a trivial way. 
 
To summarize the discussion, many researchers have argued that income inequality 
could either be beneficial or detrimental to economic growth by working through 
various channels, none of which are mutually exclusive. The empirical literature 
contains examples of findings suggesting that inequality is good for growth (Barro, 
2000; Forbes, 2000; Scully, 2002) and negative for growth (Persson and Tabellini, 
1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1994; Mo, 2000).
5 This ambiguity leads Forbes 
(2000: 885) to stress the possibility that “within-country and cross-country relationships 
between inequality and growth work through very different channels and are of opposite 
signs”. It is nonetheless an unappealing idea to most economists that economic 
mechanisms somehow should work differently within countries than between them. The 
alternative arising from the above discussion is that at least part of the discrepancy 
between these studies derives from failing to account for different levels of tolerance of 
inequality, as the former may tend to sort out these effects to the extent that they are 
time-invariant. 
 
2.2. Experimental studies 
A first indication of how mental models can quantitatively affect economic outcomes 
comes from recent work in experimental economics, which among many other things 
also seeks to illuminate the relationship between inequality and economic outcomes. In 
an experiment where the experimenters are able to distinguish between the degree to 
which merit translates into higher income, Mitchell et al. (1993: 636) find that 
“inequality becomes more acceptable as people are better rewarded for their efforts”. In 
the set-up where merit translates moderately into income, which is arguably closest to 
                                                 
5 Forbes (2000) concludes that the positive association in panel data analysis is robust while she also 
replicates the weak negative effect of previous studies in cross-sectional analyses. That panel studies tend 
to find a positive effect while cross-sectional studies find a negative effect suggests that time-invariant 
factors could be central. It is nevertheless an important point to note that studies finding a positive 
association tend to use slightly different measures of inequality than others. 
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political ideology and distributive strategy was startlingly strong” (Ibid.). In more recent 
large-scale experimental studies, Scott et al. (2001) and Michelbach et al. (2003) in 
general confirm these results and find that individuals’ perceptions of what is a just 
income distribution are significantly determined by political ideology, although with 
some qualifications. They conclude that when people perceive initial conditions such as 
the distribution of rights and possibilities as unfair, then no factual income distribution 
can be perceived as entirely fair or tolerable. Whether it is sufficiently fair to be 
acceptable depends on how much weight people give an efficiency-equity trade-off, and 
the way they perceive it. How such conditions are perceived arguably depends on 
political ideology. In particular, the authors find that equality-efficiency preferences are 
heavily influenced by political ideology. The studies thus find a strong association 
between political ideology and tolerance of inequality, which I will use in the following. 
 
Pushed to their logical conclusion, the studies above seem to suggest an impact of 
Landes’ (2000) cultural distinction: inequality matters more when people ask the 
essentially Marxian question “who did this to us?” instead of asking the Hayekian 
question “what did we do wrong?”. Collecting the scattered suggestions from economic 
history, surveys, experiments and empirical studies provides a potential explanation of 
the widely varying results in the empirical literature that leads to the following 
hypothesis: income inequality is only harmful to the extent that people perceive it to be 
signaling unfair circumstances in society and hence do not tolerate it. Where this is so, 
inequality can for example have adverse effects running through weaker social cohesion 
and trust, increasing government intervention in the economy, undermining the 
legitimacy of legal systems, or weaken perceived incentives. It is therefore the aim of 
this paper to test the broad hypothesis that the potentially negative effects of income 
inequality are alleviated when substantial parts of the population tolerate the actual level 
of inequality.  
 
3. Measuring tolerance by political ideology 
The implications of the above constitute what is to be tested in section 4. However, a 
measure of tolerance of income inequality is needed before doing so. The literature on 
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for the differences in mental models with respect to inequality and tolerance of it. The 
simple distinction made in the introduction also supports this suggestion, as pure 
Marxists would find inequality strongly unfair and detrimental to society while 
individuals with a pure Hayekian mental model of society would see inequality as 
natural, fair and even desirable due to its efficiency effects. All three experimental 
studies above find that political ideology is strongly associated with how individuals 
perceive inequality, a notion that can also be supported by research in voter behavior. In 
particular, Downs (1957) developed the idea of the rationally ignorant voter based on 
the argument that in an ideal world, voters will be well informed about the fine 
differences between political parties. However, obtaining this information is costly and 
time-consuming, and it is therefore irrational to do so since the opportunity costs are 
prohibitively high. In other words, it is rational to be ignorant and cast ones’ vote purely 
based on cheap talk such as political signals. Political ideology constitutes such a signal 
and voters who agree with a broad ideological statement will therefore vote for the 
parties that reveal an ideology by the signals they send, which is consistent with their 
mental models - whether or not parties follow their own ideology after the election is an 
entirely different matter. Taking Downs’ (1957) argument to its logical conclusion 
consequently suggests that actual voting behavior could constitute a reasonable proxy 
for individuals’ tolerance of income inequality.  
 
Accepting that political ideology can proxy for tolerance, the next step is to find a 
measure of ideology for which national election results might represent a natural source. 
I build on this notion by using the general categorization by Beck et al. (2001) who 
define the three largest government parties at any time according to whether they have a 
leftwing, centrist or rightwing political orientation. By coding leftwing parties –1, 
centrist parties 0, and rightwing parties 1, a crude measure of the self-professed 
ideology of government is obtained. This measure also corresponds to the political 
ideology of the median voter and therefore proxies for his or her tolerance of inequality. 
Moreover, taking the assumption that ‘national’ ideologies remain relatively stable over 
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 6 
This procedure probably sorts out most fads and government changes due to political 
fatigue, failure and mischance. The resulting index is distributed between –1 and 1, 
where countries that have had a fully leftwing government throughout the period are 
assumed to have a population in which the majority has leftwing sympathies and 
ideology; people in such countries are thus averse to inequality. Countries with 
rightwing governments in all years, on the other hand, should have populations that care 
relatively less for inequality and more for efficiency. Following the arguments above, 
inequality should have a more positive effect in the latter countries. It must be stressed 
that although measures of political ideology can be calculated for a large number of 
countries, they only make sense in democracies where voters are free to vote for 
whomever they choose and thus reveal their true preferences. The samples used in the 
rest of the paper therefore only include countries that have been democratic for at least 
part of the period 1971-2000. Being democratic is defined as having a score of 3 or less 
on the Gastil index of political rights (Freedom House, 2003).  
 
4. Data and estimation  
To sum up, the implications of the theoretical considerations in section 2 are that 
inequality may be bad for growth, but only to the extent that it is perceived to be unfair, 
i.e. that people do not tolerate it. Hence, it should be expected that the coefficient on 
inequality is negative and that the interaction term between inequality and ideology is 
                                                 
6 A number of values and perceptions have indeed been found to be remarkably stable by e.g. the World 
Values Survey. Generalized trust, which Uslaner (2002) and others see as a moral value with deep 
historical roots in e.g. religion, is central to most definitions and measures of social capital. The national 
scores on generalized trust in the 1981, 1990 and 1999 waves of the World Values Survey have 
correlations of 0.9. In the analyses below, the ideology measure is normalized to be distributed N(0,1). It 
should be noted that data from the Comparative Manifestos Project may be an alternative source of 
political ideology. However, these data to a larger extent depend on the actual situation in countries. For 
example, the Democratic party in the US seems to put more focus on labour unions than e.g. 
Scandinavian socialist parties, the reason being that union membership is high in Scandinavia. Such 
complications make the simple ideology measure adopted here preferable. 
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the effects of income inequality should be measured with greater accuracy when taking 
ideology into account. The notation of the equation is that γ is inequality, α is political 
ideology, and X and Z are vectors of control variables.  
 
  01 2 1 2 ˆ
ii i i i YX i i Z β βγ βγα χ χ ε =+ + + + +       ( 1 )  
 
The restriction that countries need to be democratic gives rise to estimating equation (1) 
using one of four different samples dictated by data availability. The 70 countries 
constituting Sample I have at least one 10-year period in which they have been 
democratic. However, the political ideology measure is likely to be imprecise for 
countries that have only been democratic for shorter periods of time. Hence, out of the 
70 countries in Sample I, 45 have been democratic (on average) in at least 20 years; 
they constitute Sample II for which ideology is more precisely measured. Sample III 
consists of observations for countries only in decades in which they on average have 
been democratic while Sample IV is Sample III without post-communist countries. 
Appendix Table A1 lists the countries and how many observations derive from any 
country in each of the samples. The maximum sample is 185 observations, which is 
reduced to 128 due to missing observations. 
 
In the following, the dependent variable is average yearly growth over a ten-year period; 
i.e. growth is measured 1971-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Inequality, γ, is 
measured by the earliest acceptable Gini coefficient in any decade taken from Deininger 
and Squire (1996); I follow their approach in adding 6.6 to Gini coefficients estimated 
using data on expenditure instead of income. Tolerance of inequality, α, is measured 
along the lines of political ideology as outlined above. If the argument above is palpable 
and the interaction term not simply measures a squared term, political ideology should 
not be too highly correlated, which is fortunately not the case. The correlation is modest 
in all samples (0.15-0.26); hence the ideology measure can be used. It does, however, 
reveal that countries in which inequality is perceived as less of a problem tend to have 
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hardly substantial in economic terms.
7
 
I include a vector X consisting of standard explanatory variables found in the literature. 
These variables include initial GDP per capita to capture conditional convergence, 
average schooling rate in years, openness to trade and the relative price level on 
investments as a proxy for the degree of market distortions.
8 Z is a vector of additional 
control variables applied in the sensitivity analysis. These variables are chosen so as to 
cover potential transmission mechanisms and thus include government expenditure, 
government share of GDP and government size to capture a redistribution channel, a 
measure of legal quality and an alternative measure of institutional quality, financial 
depth to proxy for the importance of financial market imperfections, and social capital 
measured by the generalized trust level. Following the theoretical considerations above, 
the expectation is therefore that the coefficient on inequality in equation (1), β1, and the 
interaction term, β2, should be of opposite signs. The full effect of inequality in country 
i is thus (β1+ αi β2) γi. Finally, the coefficient vectors χ1 and χ2 should naturally conform 
to the standard findings. Table 1 describes the data used; Table A2 lists sources and 
definitions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
7 Regressing inequality on political ideology, initial GDP and initial GDP squared, i.e. estimating a 
Kuznets curve, shows that shocking political ideology by one standard deviation leads approximately to a 
2 point increase in the Gini coefficient. It shows only limited support for the curve, although GDP 
squared is only significant at the 10% level and the effect of only a few cases, which is underscored by 
the fact that the estimated turning point of the curve is at an implausibly high GDP per capita. Estimating 
the Barro (2000) specification even fares worse in the present samples. 
8 I use the price level of investments relative to the consumer price level. Similar but slightly less precise 
results are obtained by following Forbes (2000) in using the price level of investments relative to the US 
price. 
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as growth, it may be necessary to control for reverse causality. In particular, a Kuznets 
curve relation would imply that growth leads to first increasing and then decreasing 
inequality. Most previous research finds no substantial reason for concern with regard to 
endogeneity between inequality and economic growth. However, I use the panel 
structure of the data to control for this effect by instrumenting present income inequality 
with the value lagged one period. Alternatively, using twice-lagged values or the earliest 
available observation as instruments does not affect the estimates in any significant 
way. With respect to schooling, openness and legal quality, I use observations at the 
beginning of each period. The relation between tolerance and growth may also be an 
issue of some concern. In particular, since most cultures represented in this study look 
upon unemployed as ‘losers’ in some respect, adopting oppositional identities implying 
a negative perception of inequality in relation to economic slowdown could be a 
psychologically appropriate reaction. In other words, low growth could lead to lower 
tolerance of inequality.
9 Using political ideology as a proxy for tolerance nevertheless 
makes no sense unless measured over a prolonged period of time. Otherwise, fads, 
government takeovers and mere chance may induce too much noise. I therefore refrain 




The results of estimating the effects of a baseline model on growth are shown in odd-
numbered columns in Table 2. The table reports the results of estimating the baseline 
                                                 
9 Tolerance of inequality may thus be connected to opportunities in society. For instance, a lack of 
employment opportunities may contribute to the active or passive choice of an oppositional identity, 
implying the perception that inequality is an order of society ‘imposed’ on the individual by certain 
groups or ‘force’. By choosing such perceptions, it could well be possible to defend ones self-respect 
while it nonetheless implies adopting an opposition towards those doing better than one self. I am grateful 
to Karsten Bjerring-Olsen for making this point. 
10 As proper instruments are hard to come by, I test the hypothesis of endogeneity between growth and the 
political ideology average using a Hausman test as follows (Maddala, 1992, 395). The test conclusively 
rejects that ideology is an endogenous variable (p<0.67). 
  14with and without controlling for ideology in each of the four samples. As not all results 
conform to standard findings the control variables warrant a short discussion. Firstly, 
schooling never becomes significant and the coefficient has the wrong sign. However, 
this need not be a cause of alarm since a horizon of ten years may not be sufficient to 
capture the effects of investments in human capital. In addition, research has questioned 
the robustness of the association between human capital and growth (Lorgelly and 
Owen, 1999; Pritchett, 2001). Secondly, two control variables can capture the effects of 
integration into the world economy: openness to trade and market distortions. It is 
puzzling that openness and distortions each are significant in only two cases. It may 
nevertheless not be surprising to the degree that inequality measures the importance of 
institutions, as it has proven difficult to separate the effects of institutions and economic 
integration (Rodrik et al., 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Finally, initial GDP per capita 
is significant in only one case and quite sensitive to the specification as found in 
previous research (e.g. Temple, 2000). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the main purpose of the paper, the odd-numbered columns show that the 
effects of income inequality appear to be fragile. Varying the sample shows that 
inequality is significant at p<0.10 in two of the four samples and insignificant in the 
other two. As such, the results replicate Deininger and Squire’s (1998) finding that 
inequality is only borderline significant although they also claim that inequality affects 
growth in undemocratic societies, but not in democratic ones. Like Knack and Keefer 
(1997), the results presented in Table 2 dismiss the latter notion, as all countries in these 
samples are democratic. If anything, the results here therefore suggest that Deininger 
and Squire’s non-result in democratic societies may be an effect of a sample consisting 
of societies that are relatively diverse with respect to tolerance of inequality. Given the 
way that the measure of ideology is thought to connect to actual tolerance of income 
inequality, restricting the attention to democratic countries only increases the accuracy 
of the measure. The lacking result may therefore be an outcome of considerable 
parameter heterogeneity and not a lack of effect per se. 
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inequality taking political ideology into account, i.e. adjusting for different levels of 
tolerance of inequality. Only when using Sample II is inequality insignificant and 
although there are rather small gains in terms of explanatory power, the inclusion of an 
interaction term substantially improves the accuracy of the estimated effect of 
inequality. What is more, the interaction term meant to capture the interplay between 
tolerance and inequality is highly significant throughout. The results thus provide 
substantial support for the notion that part of the effect of inequality on growth is 
mediated by how individuals perceive it, and that the apparent fragility found by 
previous research may be due to parameter heterogeneity.
11 The results also support the 
theoretical prediction that some of the transmission mechanisms may depend on 
tolerance. In order to exemplify the effects, the results indicate that income inequality 
has a significantly negative overall effect on growth in an average country with a per 
capita income of about 6000 US$ and a Gini coefficient of 40. The findings in Table 2 
indicate that in countries with a political ideology one standard deviation above the 
average, the adverse effect of inequality is about 20% smaller than at the average. 
Hence, the effects of tolerance of inequality as revealed by political ideology are not 
only of statistical significance but also of economic importance. 
 
Table 3 explores some of the potential mechanisms through which these effects may 
flow, the idea being that including a measure of a transmission channel should be 
reflected in the coefficients on inequality and the interaction term. Table 4 further 
explores these mechanisms by regressing them on initial GDP, income inequality and 
the interaction term. The tables report findings of using Sample IV but results are robust 
to varying the sample. Columns one to three test for the effects running through 
redistribution, which would be captured in either government size, government 
expenditure or governments’ share of GDP. The inclusion of either of these variables 
has no effect on the coefficients on inequality and thus lends support to Rodriguez’s 
(1999) finding that inequality does not lead to redistribution. Table 4 lends additional 
                                                 
11 An alternative procedure where observations are weighted according to their degree of democracy 
turned out to yield similar results. 
  16credibility to this interpretation as only government size is affected by inequality. The 
table also reports the results of estimating the determinants of government size without 
the interaction term, as this is the only of the three redistribution proxies where 
inequality becomes significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column four in Table 3 includes legal quality to test for Keefer and Knack’s (2002) 
finding that the effects of inequality mainly run through its effects on the quality of 
formal institutions. Although the coefficient on legal quality is insignificant it has the 
effects of improving the explanatory power substantially, cutting the coefficient on the 
interaction term in half and significantly reducing the coefficient on inequality. Table 4 
substantiates this finding by showing that legal quality is indeed affected by inequality, 
supporting Keefer and Knack’s (2002) findings; yet, legal quality is also strongly 
affected by the interaction term. However, it should be stressed that both remain 
significant at p<0.10 in Table 3, although inequality barely so. The effects running 
through legal quality may thus fail to tell the whole story. I therefore include an 
alternative measure of formal institutions as a control for the possibility that legal 
quality is proxying for other institutional effects. The variable, regulatory quality, has 
only very little impact on the coefficients on inequality and Table 4 moreover shows 
that it is completely unaffected by inequality.
12 Column six in Table 3 tests for another 
alternative by including a measure of financial depth, which is left out of Table 4, as 
none of the three control variables proved to be significant. Financial depth turns out to 
have no effect on growth or the coefficients on inequality. As a last alternative, I include 
social trust as a measure of informal institutions found to affect growth. The last column 
in Table 3 lends substantial support for the claim that trust is an important determinant 
                                                 
12 Further probing into regulatory quality (not shown) reveals that the near significance at p<0.10 of the 
interaction term in Table 4 is an effect of political ideology per se. It should be stressed, however, that 
this might be either due to a real effect of ideology or an ideological bias in the measure. 
  17of economic growth (Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001). Although these findings 
should be interpreted tentatively since the sample size is substantially reduced, it is 
worth noting that inequality becomes insignificant and the size of the coefficient 
dwindles. Social trust, on the other hand, emerges significant with a quite large 
coefficient. The interaction term between ideology and inequality is nonetheless only 
slightly reduced and remains significant at p<0.10. Table 4 also indicates that the 
interaction term has no effect on trust while inequality itself has a substantial effect, a 
finding that is in accordance with the theoretical arguments in section 2.  
 
The findings in Tables 3 and 4 thus point to the conclusion that inequality has a 
negative effect on economic growth, which runs through the quality of formal and 
informal institutions. The results thus support the claims of both Keefer and Knack 
(2002) and of Zak and Knack (2001) while there is no indication of the more traditional 
view that inequality affects growth by leading to distortionary redistribution (e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Both institutional channels have independent effects, yet 
it should be emphasized that the interaction term between inequality and political 
ideology remains significant in both cases. One could speculate that this is an indication 
of an independent incentives channel, yet this question is left for future research. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
This paper has examined the much-researched connection between income inequality 
and economic growth. A review of a set of potential transmission mechanisms 
connecting inequality and growth argued that some of these might depend not only on 
inequality per se, but also on individuals’ tolerance of inequality. By using political 
ideology as a measure of revealed tolerance of inequality and normative attitudes such 
as merit assumptions and equity-efficiency tradeoffs, the paper tested for the influence 
of such features. The findings suggest that the weakly identified effect of inequality in 
previous cross-country studies may be due to parameter heterogeneity as part of the 
effect depends on tolerance. Furthermore, the findings suggest that inequality leads to 
lower legal quality, but more so in an ideologically leftwing environment while it 
affects social trust equally across all countries. Consequently, the main part of the 
effects of inequality on growth is likely due to its effects on legal quality and trust. 
  18 
The interpretation of the results nevertheless rests on accepting that political ideology is 
in fact an appropriate proxy for individuals’ tolerance of inequality. Other 
interpretations exist, yet the immediate implication of the findings irrespective of the 
interpretation is that the perspective that ‘one size fits all’ is faulty. Voters’ sensitivity 
must be taken into consideration but is not necessarily reflective of the economically 
optimal level of inequality. In a broader perspective there are a number of other 
disputed transmission mechanisms and findings that probably depend on individuals’ 
perceptions of them and their tolerance of existing conditions. Future empirical research 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Minimum  Maximum  Average  Std.  dev.  Observations 
Decadal growth  7.84  339.19 79.63 55.56 160 
Initial GDP per capita  322  23217  6090  5438  162 
Schooling  0.5 12.0 6.08 2.72  159 
Openness 11.5  226.3  68.2  38.15  168 
Market  distortion  0.79 4.58 1.40 0.68  168 
Gini  coefficient  21.5 70.7 40.2 9.97  171 
Political  ideology  -1.00 1.00 0.09 0.74  155 
Government share of GDP  4.14  46.02  17.24  8.57  162 
Government  size  1.87 8.69 5.47 1.48  167 
Legal  quality  1.95 9.62 6.35 1.82  166 
Government expenditure  4.51  37.40  16.37  5.93  169 
Social trust  5.0  66.1  33.5  15.64  69 
Note: statistics are for the full sample I. 
 
 
  24Table 2. Results – Different samples 
Dependent variable  Decadal growth rate, GDP per capita 
Sample
 
       









  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Inequality -0.197*  -0.268* 













Inequality*ideology            
 
 









Openness 0.119*  0.061 













Schooling -0.035  -0.056 













































Observations 128 118 95 92 102 97 98 93
Adjusted  R  squared                 
         
           
0.512 0.534 0.528 0.555 0.503 0.508 0.502 0.511
F statistic  20.026  17.766  16.045  15.185 15.600 13.414 14.974 13.037
Standard error of estimate  37.256  35.569  36.568 35.724 35.118 33.374 35.833 33.986
Note: all regressions include a constant term and period dummies; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. 
 
  25Table 3. Transmission mechanisms 
Dependent variable  Decadal growth rate, GDP per capita 
  1         
 
2 3    4 5 6 7
Inequality -0.436**  -0.452** 














      
     
    
   
             
           
            
               
0.301***  0.302*** 











Openness 0.049  0.062 











Schooling -0.044  -0.052 







































Government size  -0.026 
(-0.257) 
Government expenditure    -0.034 
(-0.322) 
Government share of GDP      -0.006 
(-0.063) 









Observations 92 92 92 87 90 92 48
Adjusted  R  squared
 
               
             
           
0.509 0.506 0.508 0.564 0.508 0.505 0.462
F  statistic 11.600 11.486 11.551 13.400 11.211 11.443 6.046
Standard error of estimate  34.030  34.184 34.195 24.316 34.222 34.221 16.876
Note: all regressions include a constant term and period dummies; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. The sample is Sample IV. 
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Table 4. Transmission mechanisms 




Legal quality  Regulatory 
quality 
Social trust 
               
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Inequality 0.220  0.292** 











Inequality*ideology       



























Observations 96 101 96 96 95 96 49
Adjusted  R  squared
 
               
             
               
0.394 0.337 0.312 0.228 0.686 0.352 0.498
F  statistic 13.364 13.733 9.634 6.596 41.982 11.327 12.908
Standard  error  of  estimate 1.194 1.212 5.162 6.787 1.043 0.756 11.936
Note: all regressions include a constant term and period dummies; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. The sample is Sample IV.
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Table A1. Countries included in the study 
 
Country name  Periods in sample  Country name  Periods in sample 
 I  II  III  IV   I  II  III  IV 
Argentina   3  3  2  2  Japan       3  3  3  3 
Australia   3  3  3  3  Latvia     1  0  1  0 
Austria     3  3  3  3  Lithuania   1  0  1  0 
Bahamas     3  3  3  3  Luxembourg  3  3  3  3 
Bangladesh  3  0  1  1  Madagascar  3 0 1 1 
Barbados    3  3  3  3  Mali        3  0  1  1 
Belgium     3  3  3  3  Mauritius  3  3  3  3 
Bolivia     3  3  2  2  Mongolia    1  0  1  0 
Botswana    3  3  3  3  Namibia     3  0  1  1 
Brazil      3  3  2  2  Netherlands  3  3  3  3 
Bulgaria    1  0  1  0  New Zealand  3  3  3  3 
Canada      3  3  3  3  Norway  3  3  3  3 
Chile       3  0  1  0  Panama      3  0  1  1 
Colombia    3  3  2  2  Papua New Guinea  3  3  3  3 
Costa Rica  3  3  3  3  Peru        3  0  1  1 
Czech  Republic  1  0  1  0  Philippines  3 0 1 1 
Denmark     3  3  3  3  Poland      1  0  1  0 
Dominican Republic  3  3  2  2  Portugal    3  3  2  2 
Ecuador     3  3  2  2  Romania     1  0  1  0 
El  Salvador  3  0  1  1  Slovakia  1 0 1 0 
Estonia  1  0  1  0  Slovenia    1  0  1  0 
Finland     3  3  3  3  South African Republic  3  0  1  1 
France    3  3  3  3  South Korea  3  0  1  1 
Gambia  3  3  2  2  Spain       3  3  2  2 
Germany     3  3  3  3  Sri Lanka   3  3  2  2 
Greece      3  3  3  3  Sweden      3  3  3  3 
Guyana      0  0  1  1  Switzerland  3  3  3  3 
Honduras    3  3  2  2  Taiwan      3  0  1  1 
Hungary   1  0  1  0  Thailand    3  3  2  2 
Iceland     3  3  3  3  Trinidad and Tobago  3  3  3  3 
India       3  3  3  3  Turkey      3  0  1  1 
Ireland     3  3  3  3  United Kingdom  3  3  3  3 
Israel      3  3  3  3  United States  3  3  3  3 
Italy       3  3  3  3  Uruguay     3  3  2  2 
Jamaica     3  3  3  3  Venezuela  3  3  3  3 
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Table A2. Data definitions and sources 
Variable Source  Description 





Penn World Tables, 
Mark 6 
GDP; Growth in real GDP; price of investment relative 
to consumer prices; government share of GDP; trade 
volume as percent of GDP. All data are adjusted for 
purchasing power, see Summers and Heston (1988; 
1991) 
Inequality Deininger  and  Squire 
(1996) 
Gini coefficient.  
Schooling  Barro and Lee (2001)  Average years spent in school. 
Political ideology  Beck et al. (2001)  Constructed as average political ideology 1975-2000, 
which is average of three largest of government parties’ 
ideology. Leftwing parties are indexed –1, centrist 0, and 




Gwartney and Lawson 
(2002) 
Subjective indices distributed from one (worst quality) to 
ten (best quality). Government size includes both the 
level of taxation and government share of GDP. 
Social trust  World Values Survey, 
Inglehart et al. (1998) 
Percentage of population answering yes to “In general, 





World Bank (2003)  Government expenditure as a share of GDP; Money 
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